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Abstract 
This paper introduces the new dataset of Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts (PAIC) and presents 
a first application of PAIC. PAIC captures the institutional provisions in political agreements concluded 
between 1989 and 2016. It provides information on 91 variables, along five dimensions: power sharing, 
transitional justice, cultural institutions, territorial self-governance, and international assistance. First, 
the paper presents the data collection and coding procedures. Then it replicates Hartzell’s and Hoddie’s 
(2007) seminal study on the relationship between power sharing and negotiated agreements, showing 
the long-term importance of a previously overlooked realm: commissions. 
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Introduction 
In 2018, 84 countries experienced internal violent conflicts, leading to about 77,000 casualties (Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program, no date). For decades, researchers and policy makers have worked on potential 
solutions to end or prevent intra-state violence. Political agreements, defined as negotiated, written and 
publicly available accords between two or more parties which seek to end political violence within a 
state through institutional reform, are crucial to build peace and to avoid conflict recurrence. Yet, many 
questions remain on the content of political agreements, on what factors determine their design, and on 
the extent to which different political agreements help to foster peace. Whilst qualitative work is 
valuable in highlighting the varieties, difficulties, and nuances in such agreements, critics point out the 
limited generalisability of the findings qualitative research generates. 
We set out to address this criticism and fill a crucial gap in the literature by creating the dataset of 
Political Agreements in Internal Conflict (PAIC), an instrument combining the granular detail essential 
to qualitative research with the breadth of cases required for quantitative approaches. Due to its 
unprecedented level of detail, PAIC facilitates the systematic and rigorous selection of case studies for 
future qualitative investigation of peace processes and political transitions and allows for testing 
hypotheses with quantitative methods. By mapping mechanisms and instruments that were never coded 
previously on such a large scale (such as cultural reforms and commissions), it allows for large-scale 
comparative studies of previously overlooked provisions with traditional dimensions, such as power 
sharing and transitional justice. By pushing beyond many existing datasets’ focus on peace agreements 
between a government and a rebel group, PAIC also speaks more broadly to qualitative studies of 
constitutional design. 
We defined the population of agreements in PAIC according to four criteria, to ensure that the dataset 
could best help answer questions about what factors determine the design of political agreements, what 
provisions are typically included and the extent to which different provisions help to foster peace. To 
be included in PAIC, agreements need to be: intra-state (i.e., aim to end or prevent violence within a 
state); substantial (i.e., prescribe reforms to domestic public institutions); written and publicly available 
on the UN Peacemaker Peace Agreements Database (Mediation Support Unit, 2018);  agreed by 
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multiple parties. We then sampled all agreements on the UN Peacemaker Peace Agreement Database 
that fulfilled these criteria. As a result, PAIC includes the full population of political agreements that 
fulfil the four selection criteria: 286 political agreements concluded between 1989 and 2016 throughout 
the world. 
PAIC contains observations on 91 variables at the level of each political agreement, along five 
dimensions: power sharing, transitional justice, cultural institutions, territorial self-governance, and 
international assistance. The choice of these five core dimensions of political agreements reflects – and 
aims to address – the ongoing debate among scholars about policy options along the continuum between 
conflict termination and conflict transformation. Conflict termination typically relies on power sharing, 
international assistance, and territorial self-governance to get antagonistic forces to the negotiating table 
and finalise a political agreement ending direct violence (Hartzel and Hoddie, 2003, 2007, 2019; Mattes 
and Savun, 2009; McGarry and O’Leary, 2008a, 2009, 2013). Conflict transformation also requires 
transitional justice processes and cultural reforms (Baker and Obradovic-Wochnik, 2016; Bell, 2009; 
Kirshner, 2018; Loyle and Apple, 2017). It is our contention that both approaches are essential to the 
management of violent intra-state conflicts and so variables speaking to both approaches should be 
included in datasets. 
These observations are complemented by standard identifying variables including correlates of war 
country code (The Correlates of War Project, n.d.), Gleditsch and Ward country codes (Gleditsch and 
Ward, 1999), ISO 3 three-digit country number (International Organization for Standardization, 
n.d.), UCDP (old and new) conflict IDs (The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.) and battle deaths 
(Allansson et al., 2017; Gleditsch et al., 2002; and UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, 
n.d. Version 17.22). These identifying variables make our data set easy to use for researchers as users 
can merge a variety of other data sources into the PAIC data set. PAIC also includes identifying 
variables that allow to look at five-year or ten-year periods after the signature of a political agreement, 
at a cross-section, or at time-series cross-sectional analysis. We provide Excel and Stata data files and 
the codebook online, allowing users to import the data into SPSS and R. We make do-files available 
online to replicate this study. 
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This article first explains the rationale for creating the PAIC dataset. Second, we unpack the definition 
of concepts, operationalisation, and coding of the PAIC variables, also presenting some descriptive 
statistics. Third, by replicating one of the most influential works in the academic debate on power 
sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie’s 2007 seminal “Crafting Peace”) this article provides an example of how 
PAIC can be used to test and expand on existing theories about the relationship between specific 
institutional designs (power sharing) and the sustainability of negotiated settlements (length of peace 
after an agreement). 
Why a New Dataset? 
The PAIC dataset provides a fine-grained coding of five sets of provisions to inform both quantitative 
and qualitative investigations of negotiated agreements aiming to end intra-state conflicts. This 
complements existing datasets of peace agreements (such as the PA-X Peace Agreements Database, 
Peace Accords Matrix, and UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset) in three main respects. 
First, PAIC offers an unprecedented level of detail in its coding, responding to calls for deeper and more 
detailed coding of peace agreements (Staniland, 2017). The coding was carried out by a team of scholars 
with substantial expertise and practical experience of the design of peace agreements. The definition of 
concepts reflects the cutting-edge debates and common understandings in five overlapping research 
fields: of power sharing, transitional justice, cultural institutions, territorial self-governance, and 
international assistance The disaggregation of each concept facilitates qualitative investigations by 
identifying fine-grained differences among provisions and allows researchers to ensure that 
comparisons are valid and that divergent provisions are not being treated as similar. It is in line with 
cutting-edge studies of political violence (Petterson et al., 2019; Raleigh et al., 2010) and of broader 
political processes (Coppedge et al., 2019) and reflects the expectation that different provisions reflect 
different conditions and lead to different outcomes in a peace process. Indeed, the PAIC dataset captures 
the level of commitment to specific clauses by differentiating between ‘prescriptive’ and ‘enabling’ 
provisions. Provisions are coded as ‘prescriptive’ when they specify deadlines (e.g., for the creation of 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission), verifiable pathways to implementation (e.g., for 
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decentralisation), or specific outcomes (e.g., legislative or executive representation for specific groups). 
They are coded as ‘enabling’ when they express intent without mapping implementation or prescribing 
a specific outcome (e.g., a general commitment to broad representativeness in a national government or 
parliament). We also distinguish between representation and participation in power sharing institutions, 
emphasising the difference between who makes decisions and where (e.g., ethnic group representatives 
in a legislative body) and how decisions are made (e.g., by a concurrent majority vote). As a 
consequence, PAIC is the only dataset that allows scholars to distinguish systematically between 
corporate and liberal varieties of power sharing.  
Second, PAIC’s fine-grained and comprehensive coding extends to mechanisms and instruments that 
were never coded previously on such a large scale. For example, existing datasets overlook cultural 
provisions, such as the reform of education systems, museums, sport, and symbols and emblems. 
Moreover, PAIC includes a fine-grained coding of commissions, which does not appear in any existing 
dataset, despite their relevance to the resilience of peace agreements (see the Application section 
below). Its holistic and granular approach to transitional justice also allows us to understand the extent 
to which provisions are being combined, diluted, or integrated. One particularly interesting consequence 
of this coding for the literature is the provision of data to identify hybrid mechanisms for transitional 
justice beyond the strictly judicial provisions. PAIC also gives us a unique insight into the combination 
of power sharing and transitional justice provisions in political agreements: two important aspects that 
increasingly co-exist in peace agreements today, but whose compatibility remains contested (Levin 
2006). 
Finally, the universe of cases in PAIC differs from existing datasets, which largely focus only on peace 
agreements between a government and a rebel group. As such, it speaks to recent calls for moving 
beyond the conventional dyadic definition of civil conflicts (inter alia related to thresholds for battle-
related-deaths) and towards a theory-informed selection of cases (Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 
2019). As further explained below, PAIC includes highly relevant examples of constitutional design for 
conflict management which are often employed as typical cases by qualitative scholars such as Kenya’s 
2008 agreement or Lebanon’s 1989 Taif Agreement (e.g., Cheeseman and Tendi, 2010; Zahar, 2005). 
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This further encourages a dialogue across methodological research cultures and promotes more mixed-
method studies of peace processes. 
Population, Concepts, and Measurement 
Population 
We define political agreements as negotiated, written and publicly available accords between two or 
more parties which seek to end political violence within a state through institutional reform.1 This 
definition guides the four criteria for selecting our population of political agreements:  
1. Intra-state agreements, i.e., agreements whose purpose is to end or prevent violence in intra-
state disputes (thus excluding purely regional or international agreements). 
2. Substantial agreements, i.e., agreements that prescribe reforms to domestic public institutions 
(thus excluding simple pre-negotiation, procedural, and ceasefire agreements). 
3. Written and publicly available agreements, i.e., be included in the UN Peacemaker Peace 
Agreements Database (Mediation Support Unit, 2018), which also ensures maximum 
transparency and replicability. 
4. Agreements between multiple parties, i.e., not be  unilateral declarations of one party only.  
Applying these criteria ensures that our units of analysis (political agreements) are comparable and 
that our population is accessible for everyone who wants to replicate our selection procedure and 
coding. As Figure 1 visually summarizes, the four criteria above generated a population of political 
agreements which overlaps but also substantially differs from existing datasets.  
Figure 1: Population of Peace Agreements Datasets Compared 
 
                                               
1 Note that we do not apply thresholds for pre-agreement battle-related deaths (thus including also agreements attempting 
to end disputes resulting in less than 1000 battle-related deaths (such as the two agreements addressing the Solomon Island’s 
ethnic violence in 1999-2003) and do not require the government to be one of the parties to the agreement (thus including 
also accords such as those following Kenya’s 2007 electoral violence).  
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LEGEND: 
NOTE: solid colours = present, checked pattern = partly present, no colour= not present 
  Including whole sequence of peace processes   
  Coding for multiple concepts   
  Including worldwide population  
  Comparable unit of analysis for all observations  
  Written and publicly available agreements   
  Agreements between different parties (excluding unilateral declarations)  
  Intra-state agreements (excluding purely regional or international dispute settlements)   
  Substantial agreements (excluding simple pre-negotiation, procedural, and ceasefire agreements)  
 
Applied to agreements concluded between 1989 and 2016 to capture the increase in intra-state conflicts 
(Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015) and in negotiated settlements of conflicts (as defined by Kreutz, 2010) 
in this period, this selection generated a population of 286 political agreements. Table I includes some 
basic descriptive statistics for the PAIC dataset. In PAIC, each agreement is identified by a unique ID, 
alongside its state and UCDP conflict ID (old and new) in order to allow cross-referencing with other 
existing datasets (Allansson et al., 2017), aggregation along the desired level (individual polity, specific 
conflict), and selection of specific cases (e.g., those agreements tackling low-level conflicts, cf. 
Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2019). Twenty-nine political agreements could not be linked with an 
existing UCDP conflict ID because they address instances of diffused political violence or rebel-rebel 
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violence rather than a rebel-government confrontation;2 coups and political confrontations;3 conflicts 
resulting in less than 25 documented battle-related deaths per year since 1989;4 or multiple conflicts in 
the case of Myanmar’s 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of the Union of Myanmar and the Ethnic Armed Organisations.  In other words, they relate to what 
Staniland (2017) would term ‘armed politics’. 
The inclusion of these additional 29 cases will be particularly useful to qualitative scholars for two 
reasons. First, scholars who focus on these cases will now be able to evaluate how they relate to other 
cases in terms of agreement content. Second, scholars working on other cases can now clearly compare 
and contrast the provisions in agreements they study with additional empirically important cases. In 
both instances this increases the ability of scholars to produce generalisable analysis and findings. 
However, we recognise that scholars using large-scale statistical models may face a challenge when 
integrating these cases into their modelling as their exclusion from UCDP datasets limits access to 
contextual variables related to these cases. 
 
Table I: Basic Descriptives 
 World Europe Asia Africa Americas 
Political Agreements 286 14 66 158 48 
Countries 60 6 16 31 7 
Number of political 
agreements by country, 
mean 
4.8 2.3 4.1 5.2 6.9 
Number of political 
agreements by country, 
median 
3 1.5 2.5 4 6 
                                               
2 Gabon’s 1994 accords; Indonesia’s 2001 Malino I declaration and 2004 Malino II declaration; the seven agreements following 
Kenya’s 2007 electoral violence. 
3 The seven agreements attempting to resolve Madagascar’s political crisis of 2009; Mauritania’s 2009 ‘Accord cadre de 
Dakar’; the 2009 agreement addressing the constitutional crisis in Honduras; the 1999, 2006 and 2009 agreements related 
to the contested elections and political transition in Togo; Zimbabwe’s 2008 power-sharing agreement; Iraq’s 2010 Erbil 
agreement. 
4 The two agreements addressing the Solomon Island’s ethnic violence in 1999-2003 and Myanmar’s 2011 and 2012 
agreements with the Mongla Armed Group, Chin National Front, New Mon State Party, and the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire 
Agreement. 
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Number of political 
agreements per year, 
mean 
10.2 2.6 2.8 6.3 2 
Number of political 
agreements per year, 
median 
10.5 1.5 2 5 3.7 
 
Concepts and Measurement 
The dataset is structured around five overarching concepts: power sharing, transitional justice, cultural 
institutions, territorial self-governance, and international assistance. Concepts are disaggregated due to 
the expectation that different provisions reflect different conditions and lead to different outcomes in a 
peace process. As mentioned, the fine-grained coding is intended to facilitate valid comparison by 
quantitative and qualitative scholars. Figure 2 summarises the data structure visually.  
Figure 2: PAIC Data Structure 
 
In line with the established literature, we see political agreements as ‘packages’ of institutions (e.g., 
Belmont, Mainwaring and Reynolds, 2002). The process of translating such interlocked concepts into 
their most fine-grained and measurable components, while ensuring the relevance and rigour of each 
variable, was iterative. Specifically, we followed Adcock’s (2001) framework for measurement validity 
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to move from the five background concepts (power sharing, transitional justice, cultural institutions, 
territorial self-governance and international assistance) to measured indicators for the 286 political 
agreements. 
The process of developing the concepts for inclusion in the dataset, and associated codebook, 
involved four stages: 
1. Five main categories were identified from the literature as central to efforts to manage, 
resolve, or transform intra-state conflict through institutional (power sharing, 
transitional justice, cultural institutions, territorial self-governance and international 
assistance, details outlined further below for each dimension);  
2. Each concept was disaggregated to reflect the different types of meaningfully distinct 
provisions included in agreements; 
3.  Indicators for concepts were identified relying on the cutting-edge debates in current 
literature; 
4. Each concept was further disaggregated between ‘prescriptive’ and ‘enabling’ 
provisions. ‘Prescriptive’ provisions specify deadlines, verifiable pathways to 
implementation, or specific outcomes. ‘Enabling’ provisions express intent without 
mapping implementation or prescribing a specific outcome. 
All coding decisions were made with reference to the codebook and based exclusively on the integral 
text of the political agreements, as available on the UN Peacemaker database (Mediation Support Unit, 
2018) to ensure replicability and transparency.  
Figure II illustrates this process for the power sharing dimension in the PAIC dataset. For clarity, we 
can describe how a specific provision would be coded at each stage of the process. For example, 
Lebanon’s Taif agreement is a landmark case for scholars of power sharing, but is not included in the 
UCDP Peace Agreements dataset (Petterson et al., 2019) or in PSED (Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015). The 
provision in Lebanon’s Taif agreement that ‘the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies shall 
be increased to 108, shared equally between Christians and Muslims’ (Taif Accords, 1989: 2) is clearly 
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an instance of one of the five main concepts – power sharing. PAIC’s fine-grained coding captures the 
details of this provision (based on debates within the power sharing literature, discussed below) as 
‘power sharing – legislature – representation’. The inclusion of details (number of deputies) makes this 
provision ‘prescriptive’. Even where they include the Lebanese case, existing datasets typically code 
only for power-sharing provisions in government (cf. Madhav and Darby, 2013; Madhav et al, 2015), 
the military and economic realms (cf. PA-X, 2018). PAIC differs from them, identifying also power 
sharing in the civil service, judiciary, and commissions. For example, in the Taif agreement, the 
provision to ‘Abolish the sectarian representation base and rely on capability and specialization in 
public jobs, the judiciary, the military, security, public, and joint institutions, and in the independent 
agencies… excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be shared equally by Christians 
and Muslims’ (Taif Accords, 1989: 5) is coded as ‘power sharing - civil service/judiciary/military – 
representation - prescriptive’.  
Following the four steps above, we carried out a sample coding of ten agreements in which all 
coders coded all ten agreements across the full range of variables. With this initial coding, we aimed to 
verify the utility of our codebook and establish the existing degree of inter-coder reliability. To check 
our intercoder reliability, we ran coding comparisons using NVivo 11. We achieved a kappa co-efficient 
of .91, indicating excellent agreement between coders. Confronted with the empirical evidence in the 
agreements, we further refined and expanded our coding nodes to reflect the nuances of different 
provisions, thus generating the final version of the codebook. Maximising individual coder expertise, 
we coded in teams of two coders for most of the five concepts, ensuring that experts of power sharing 
coded power sharing provisions, transitional justice experts coded transitional justice provisions, etc. 
Initial coding was carried out in NVivo 11. 
We then transferred our qualitative coding into a binary coding on an excel spreadsheet. All variables 
are coded 1 if they are present in the political agreement – 0 if otherwise. When looking at Cronbach’s 
alpha we find that power sharing has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.81, transitional justice a Cronbach’s alpha 
of 0.81, cultural reforms a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69, territorial self-governance a Cronbach’s alpha of 
0.33, and international assistance a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.61 (where values between 0.7 and 0.95 are 
  12 
generally accepted [Tavakol and Dennick, 2011: 54]). The low score for territorial self-governance may 
be caused by the rather simple coding scheme (autonomy, decentralisation, federation, and referendum 
on future independence). The lack of consistency of the variables we coded less in-depth corroborates 
the value of in-depth coding. Future iterations of the data set will look further into the measurement of 
territorial self-governance and international assistance. 
Finally, we added further standard control variables (see below). We also employed a research assistant 
to check coding across a random selection of 10 percent of agreements to ensure the reliability of our 
measurements and of our codebook.  
Power sharing 
The conceptualisation and operationalisation of the power sharing variable draws on the extensive 
debate between proponents of consociational power sharing (e.g., Lijphart, 1977; 2002; McGarry and 
O’Leary, 2008a; 2008b) and proponents of centripetal power sharing (e.g., Horowitz, 2003; 2008; 
Reilly 2001; 2012). Despite extensive disagreements over what constitutes power sharing (Binningsbø, 
2013; Horowitz, 2014; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2019; Strom et al., 2017), both schools of 
thought focus on two core dimensions of the concept. First, they consider power sharing as reflecting 
the representation of groups (who makes decisions and where). For example, the Washington 
Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina entrenches power sharing inter alia by providing for 
representation of the three constituent people across public institutions, including the judiciary:  
‘There shall be a Supreme Court, which shall have selective appellate jurisdiction from the 
courts of the cantons and such jurisdiction as specified in the Constitution and in 
legislation. The members of the Court shall be nominated by the President and elected by 
the Legislature, and shall consist of an equal number of judges from each of the constituent 
peoples’ (Washington Agreement, 1994: 6) 
Scholars also show that power sharing stems from participation of relevant groups in decision-making 
(through rules on how decisions are made). For example, the Dayton agreement clearly states that 
‘Decisions of the Government that concern the vital interest of any of the constituent peoples shall 
require consensus’ (Washington Agreement, 1994: 6). The dimensions of representation and 
participation may be expressed in a number of fields (e.g. political, military, economic, judiciary) with 
important implications for the stability of the settlement (Bormann et al., 2019; Hartzell and Hoddie, 
  13 
2007; McCrudden and O’Leary, 2013; Schneckener, 2002). We drew on these theoretical debates to 
conceptualise and operationalize power sharing, as graphically illustrated in Error! Reference source 
not found..5 In doing so, we offered a crucial contribution to existing data on the content of peace 
agreements: before PAIC, datasets only identified political, military and economic power sharing (cf. 
Madhav and Darby, 2013; Madhav et al., 2015; Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015; PA-X, 2018). 
                                               
5 Similar schemes for transitional justice, territorial self-governance, international assistance and cultural institutions are 
available in the codebook. 
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Figure 3: Power sharing from concept to measurement (cf. Adcock and Collier, 2001). 
 
 
The PAIC codebook explains in extensive detail the operationalization of each fine-grained indicator 
for power sharing. For example, legislative power sharing is coded as 1 when a political agreement 
includes the indicators summarised in Table II. Additional indicators refer to power sharing in the 
executive, judiciary, civil service, economy, military, and other bodies and commissions. 
We find that two-thirds of political agreements (67%) include some form of power sharing. Measures 
ensuring the representation of politically relevant groups in state institutions are more frequent than 
provisions on participation in decision-making: 66% of agreements specify who makes decisions, but 
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only 17% of agreements consider rules of decision-making.  
In an important contribution to the existing literature we find that power sharing embedded in other 
bodies and commissions occurs far more frequently than in the core legislative (e.g., parliament), 
executive (e.g., cabinet), military, economic or judicial institutions (e.g., courts). For example, 
Burundi’s Arusha accords establish power sharing inter alia through rules for the representation of 
previously warrying groups in commissions:  
‘The Ceasefire Commission shall consist of representatives of the Government, the 
combatants of the political parties and movements, the United Nations, the Organization 
of African Unity and the Regional Peace Initiative for Burundi’ (Arusha Peace and 
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, 2000: 72).  
The same accord also maps the participation of all groups in decision-making: ‘The Ceasefire 
Commission shall take its decisions by consensus’ (Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement 
for Burundi, 2000: 72). This suggests an important role for a previously overlooked institution 
(commissions) in sustaining peace agreements, as the application section below confirms. 
Table II: Operationalisation of power sharing in the legislature. For the whole range of dimensions of power sharing, 
please see the codebook. 
D
im
en
si
on
s Indicators 
Enabling (S) Prescriptive (H) 
R
ep
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
Legislature: The agreement enables 
arrangements or includes a general commitment 
to enable proportional representation of certain 
groups in legislative bodies, e.g., PR Election 
System, regional or communal electoral rolls, 
etc. 
Legislature: The agreement provides for the 
mandatory inclusion of representatives of certain 
groups into the legislative branch. 
 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
at
io
n Legislature: The agreement includes provisions 
that enable, or express commitment to, the use 
of qualified majority voting procedure for 
certain legislative decisions, e.g., supermajority, 
concurrent majority, etc. 
Legislature: The agreement requires a qualified 
majority voting procedure for certain legislative 
decisions.  
 
Transitional justice 
The United Nations sees transitional justice as comprising ‘the full range of processes and mechanisms 
associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include both judicial and 
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non-judicial mechanisms, with differing levels of international assistance (or none at all) and individual 
prosecutions, reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a combination 
thereof’ (United Nations Security Council, 2004). Following this definition, we code transitional justice 
along two parsimonious dimensions of ‘judicial’ and ‘non-judicial’, broken down into 19 specific 
mechanisms: lustration, guarantees of non-recurrence, prisoner release, amnesty, prosecution of 
conflict-related crimes, judiciary reform, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), 
security sector reform (SSR), economic and social reform, gender, institutional reform, reconciliation, 
refugee return, reparations, gender, hybrid and truth-seeking. We operate with a broad definition of 
transitional justice to include issues usually at the boundaries of the field, such as DDR, SSR, and 
particular aspects of refugee return (see also Grodsky, 2009).6  
This extensive coding enables us to concretely engage with debates around the impact of holistic 
approaches to transitional justice in post-conflict societies (Arthur, 2009a; Nickson and Braithwaite, 
2014; Ramji-Nogales, 2001; Sharp, 2014; Yakinthou and Croeser, 2016). It is particularly important to 
note in this context that we coded on an inclusive basis to identify all transitional justice provisions. 
This enables other researchers to examine whether there are competing provisions or provisions that 
reflect competing interests. Choosing to code approaches such as prosecutions and amnesty horizontally 
(without a value judgement as to whether they may be internally competing) makes it possible to 
identify clashing provisions when reviewing the dataset. 
The conceptualisation and operationalisation of transitional justice provisions is described extensively 
in the codebook. As an illustrative example, a political agreement is coded as including (judicial) 
prosecution of conflict-related crimes if it expresses intent to prosecute conflict-related crimes or refers 
to a general prohibition of amnesty. For example, the Central African Republic’s 2015 Republican Pact 
for Peace, National Reconciliation and Reconstruction provides for  
the introduction of a constitutional provision ruling out the possibility of amnesty for 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of genocide committed in the Central 
                                               
6 We also include amnesty in our coding because it is important to see where amnesties exist, and how they exist in 
combination with other transitional justice provisions (such as truth commissions and criminal prosecutions). 
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African Republic’ (Republican Pact for Peace, National Reconciliation and 
Reconstruction, 2015: 3). 
Conversely, an agreement includes a non-judicial provision for truth-seeking if it expresses intent to 
establish a truth and/or reconciliation commission or another non-judicial body that gives space to 
victims and marginalised groups of the population that suffered conflict-related violence. Truth seeking 
may also refer to other fact-finding bodies, documentation efforts related to atrocities, and other efforts 
to seek information about atrocities committed during or as part of the conflict. For example, El 
Salvador’s 1991 agreements establishes a Commission on the Truth: 
‘The Commission shall have the task of investigating serious acts of violence that have 
occurred since 1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public should 
know the truth’ (Mexico Agreement, 1991: 5). 
Over two thirds of the political agreements in the PAIC dataset include provisions for transitional justice 
(69%). Non-judicial provisions are more frequent than their judicial counterparts (64% of agreements 
containing the former and 46% of agreements containing the latter). We find that provisions usually 
considered to be at the boundaries of the field are frequently employed to address legacies of widespread 
abuse, through reparations (37%), disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration or security sector 
reform (DDR-SSR, 35.6%), and refugee return (28%). We also find that, contrary to the widespread 
turn in the last decade towards questioning their legality as human rights norms have evolved (Laplante, 
2009), amnesties remain common in existing political agreements, and are far more frequent than 
provisions for truth-seeking (27% compared with 13% of agreements).  
Cultural Institutions 
In his seminal works, Johan Galtung identified three types of violence: direct violence (what we 
commonly identify as war or violent conflict); structural violence (the social hierarchies and injustices 
which often underpin direct conflict); and cultural violence, encompassing  
those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence […] that can be used to 
justify or legitimise direct or structural violence’ (Galtung, 1990: 291).  
In affirming that ‘entire cultures can hardly be classified as violent’, Galtung (1990: 191) nonetheless 
suggests specific aspects of selected ‘cultures’ that may underpin conflict (religion, ideology, language, 
art, empirical science, formal science and cosmology). We take this logic a step further in coding the 
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mechanisms and institutions through which such aspects of culture may be expressed, reproduced, and 
even transformed following a political agreement.  
The PAIC dataset intends to be a first step in a broader research agenda examining the relationship 
between these cultural expressions of violence and sustainable peace, as no existing dataset codes 
systematically for all these institutions on such a large scale. In an iterative process based on fine-
grained and comprehensive coding of the political agreements in the PAIC dataset, we identify seven 
instruments for cultural reform: cultural activities, cultural associations, education, monuments, sport, 
symbols, and the media. For example, a political agreement addresses the media if it includes reforms 
of the communication media and/or of their political function with or without deadlines or 
specifications. In Colombia’s 2016 Final Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and 
Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, the government and FARC commit to establishing 
‘Broadcasters for coexistence and reconciliation’, specifying further that  
‘20 stations will be established in FM, of public interest, class "C", in the areas most 
affected by the conflict… will be assigned to Radio Televisión Nacional de Colombia - 
RTVC, with the aim of teaching the contents and informing about the progress of the 
implementation of the Final Agreement. For 2 years, the Joint Communications 
Committee, composed of delegates from the National Government and the FARC-EP in 
transit to civilian life, will define, by mutual agreement, the contents of pedagogy and its 
production. The stations may operate 24 hours a day’ (Final Agreement for the 
Termination of the Conflict and Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace, 2016) 
An overview of the PAIC dataset shows that cultural reforms are a moderately common feature of intra-
state political agreements, with 40% of agreements charting reforms of cultural institutions. Thus, it is 
surprising that so little attention has been paid to their long-term impact on the resilience and success 
of war-to-peace transitions. Reflecting both their salience during conflict and widespread international 
attention paid to them, education and the media are the most common targets of reform in the aftermath 
of violent conflict (with 29% and 21% of agreements addressing them, respectively).  
Territorial Self-Governance 
Territorial self-governance establishes the legally entrenched power of territorially delimited entities 
within the internationally recognized boundaries of existing states to exercise public policy functions 
independently of other sources of authority in this state, but subject to its overall legal order (Wolff, 
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2013: 32). A vigorous debate has been ongoing within the civil conflict literature between scholars 
arguing that the dispersion of power through territorial self-governance arrangements mitigates conflict 
by affording identity groups a degree of recognition, control, and security, and those who maintain that 
such arrangements aggravate conflict by accentuating differences and providing rebels with greater 
opportunities to challenge the state, and potentially secede (Bormann et al., 2019; Horowitz, 1985; 
Nordlinger, 1972; McGarry, 2007; Elkins and Sides, 2007; Meadwell, 2009, Cederman et al., 2015; 
Vogt, 2015).  
These arguments revolve around the extent of the powers enjoyed by distinct levels of government as 
well as the foundation of the legitimate exercise of these powers. Typically, existing peace agreements 
datasets code territorial self-governance as general instances of ‘decentralisation/federalism’ (Madhav 
and Darby, 2013; Madhav et al., 2015). However, in order to more precisely capture how different types 
of territorial self-governance reflect different approaches to territorial state construction, symmetry and 
asymmetry of self-governance provisions, and their legal entrenchment, PAIC distinguishes between 
federation, autonomy, and decentralisation, and adds a fourth category of ‘referendum’ mapping a path 
to independence. Other studies simply include territorial provisions as instances of ‘territorial power 
sharing’ (cf. Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015; PA-X. 2018). However, there is some debate as to whether 
territorial self-governance, especially in the absence of federation or similar shared-rule provisions, is 
more accurately seen as power dividing or power dispersion rather than power sharing. PAIC’s separate 
coding focuses on the dispersion of power. However, scholars interested in territorial power sharing can 
easily re-integrate, into their operationalisation of power sharing, some or all the elements of territorial 
self-governance coded in PAIC. 
The codebook describes the operationalisation of each category of territorial self-governance. By way 
of example, an agreement includes federation if it establishes structures with distinct and exclusive 
competences for a federal government and lower-level constituent entities which are entrenched in the 
constitution and cannot be unilaterally altered by either side (McGarry and O’Leary, 2013). For 
example, Somalia’s 2004 Transitional Federal Charter, states that  
‘The Somali Republic shall comprise of: (a) The Transitional Federal Government. (b) 
State Governments (two or more regions federate, based on their free will) (c) Regional 
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Administrations (d) District administrations.’ The Charter then details the specific 
responsibilities of each level of government’ (Transitional Federal Charter, 2004: 4)  
Therefore, it is coded as ‘Territorial self-governance – federation – prescriptive’. 
Basic descriptive statistics for the PAIC dataset show that territorial self-governance remains rare, with 
only 23% of political agreements including provisions for the allocation of an independent public policy 
role to a sub-state geographic unit. By providing additional fine-grained data on the application of 
territorial self-governance worldwide, PAIC shows that decentralisation is the most common category 
(with 10% of agreements including provisions for decentralisation). Only 2% of the agreements in PAIC 
include provisions for an independence referendum, confirming the sui generis nature of these 
provisions. 
International Assistance 
International assistance is a practice frequently enshrined in political agreements in internal conflicts, 
with international organisations, third-party states, and high-profile individuals acting in a wide range 
of roles from the earliest stages of a peace process (e.g., by mediating initial ceasefires), to the 
implementation of agreements (e.g., by administrating elections and verifying their results), to the 
peace-building stage (e.g., by repairing and constructing physical infrastructure). Existing scholarship 
notes the increase in such involvement immediately after the end of the Cold War and the challenges 
which international actors face during these interventions (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Paris and Sisk, 2009; 
Stedman et al., 2002).  Moreover, it has long been recognised that  third-party involvement significantly 
differs in terms of its ‘depth’ (Bercovitch & Houston, 2000; Touval and Zartman, 1985). Building on 
this work, we coded international assistance into four central categories: monitoring, implementation, 
direct governance, and peace-keeping operations. This definition is considerably broader than that 
employed in many existing datasets and in quantitative studies, which often focus on UN peacekeeping 
and military interventions, their impact, and variations over time (Fortna, 2008; Madhav and Darby, 
2013; Madhav et al., 2015; Paris, 2003; PA-X, 2018; Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl, 2007; Howard 
and Stark, 2018). Thus, PAIC provides a vital insight into certain types of international interventions. 
Scholars focused on peace-keeping operations will be able to use PAIC to ascertain and analyse when 
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and where provisions for such operations are included in peace agreements. However, internationals 
actors have also been assigned important roles in agreements beyond peacekeeping, and PAIC also 
captures these cases, thus allowing for the comparative analysis of the wider range of roles third-party 
actors assume. For example, PAIC also captures instances of involvement of influential non-military 
actors, such as the Catholic church and Amnesty International in Colombia’s 1991 Final Agreement 
between the National Government and the Popular Liberation Army:  
‘To obtain the presence of institutions which are neither governmental nor international 
democratic entities in the act of surrendering weapons, it is agreed that the national 
government and the EPL will offer invitations to the UN, Amnesty International, the 
Church and some international entities’ (Final Agreement between the National 
Government and the Popular Liberation Army, 1991: 5) 
The codebook explains the conceptualisation and operationalisation of each level of involvement. For 
example, an agreement includes monitoring if it provides for the international community generally or 
a specific third party to monitor or verify the implementation of either the agreement broadly or of a 
specific element within the agreement. For example, Angola’s 1994 Lusaka Protocol states that the 
‘Overall supervision, control and verification of the re-established ceasefire will be the responsibility 
of the United Nations’ (Lusaka Protocol, 1994: 9). Similarly, Chad’s 2009 Peace Agreement between 
the Government of the Republic of Chad and the National Movement establishes that ‘The Great 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Republic is responsible for the application of this Agreement’ (Peace 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chad and the National Movement, 2009: 3). 
We find that international assistance is a common feature of intra-state political agreements, with 65% 
of agreements including a role for international actors and we can also observe an overall slight decline 
in international involvement (Table A6-A9) as already suggested by Howard and Stark (2018). Third 
parties are mostly charged with implementation assistance (in 50% of agreements), followed by a 
monitoring role (in 45% of agreements). Only 1% of agreements include provisions for direct 
governance by the international community. 
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Using the Data 
Eberwein (2008) suggests that datasets are interesting in three respects: to provide data on policy 
development, to evaluate past performance, and to inform new policies. In addition, the PAIC dataset 
is particularly suitable to help theory-building by allowing for rigorous selection of case studies for 
nuanced and rich qualitative investigations of statistically significant effects or to test hypotheses 
generated by in-depth qualitative work against the whole population of political agreements. Moreover, 
as we demonstrate below, PAIC is also useful to reassess existing findings and theories against 
expanded and more fine-grained data.  
To allow for easy use of PAIC for quantitative as well as qualitative scholars, we added a substantial 
amount of standard identifying variables including correlates of war country code (The Correlates of 
War Project, n.d.), Gleditsch and Ward country codes (Gleditsch and Ward, 1999), ISO 3 three-digit 
country number (International Organization for Standardization, n.d.), UCDP conflict IDs (the old 
conflict id as well as the new version [The Uppsala Conflict Data Program, n.d.]) and battle deaths 
(Allansson et al., 2017; Gleditsch et al., 2002; UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, n.d. 
Version 17.22). Control variables and dependent variables are included for up to ten years after the 
conclusion of a political agreement. As a result, the dataset can be used for cross-sectional as well as 
for time-series cross-sectional analysis. 
This dataset has three main limitations. First, our dataset only focuses on internal conflicts. However, 
internal armed conflict has been the dominant form of violent conflict in the last decades, and deserves 
special attention (Eberwein, 2008). A focus on internal conflicts is crucial to inform debates on 
institutional design in the context of the termination and transformation of internal conflicts. Second, 
this dataset only presents the ‘promises’ of political agreements (Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015), and does 
not trace their implementation. This is in line with most other large peace agreement datasets (Petterson 
et al., 2019; PA-X, 2018; Language of Peace, 2019). PAIC’s coding of prescriptive and enabling 
provisions indicates the extent of commitment to implementation of their different components. 
Moreover, the inclusion of state and UCDP conflict IDs for each political agreement allows for cross-
referencing with other existing datasets which code for implementation of a selected number of political 
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agreements (e.g., Joshi and Quinn, 2017; Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015; and partially Strom et al., 2017). 
Finally, new projects born out of the PAIC dataset and focusing on a smaller selection of agreements 
code for implementation. This is in line with other existing datasets coding for implementation, which 
typically focus on fewer than 45 countries (e.g., Joshi and Quinn, 2017; Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015). 
Application  
This section will evaluate how the PAIC dataset can be used to replicate existing quantitative studies, 
demonstrating its rigour, usefulness, and validity vis-a-vis current datasets. The number of peace 
agreement datasets has expanded over the past decade, with several databases partly overlapping with 
PAIC (Druckman and Wagner, 2017; Högbladh, 2011; Joshi et al., 2017; Joshi and Darby, 2013; PA-
X, 2018). Many of these datasets have been employed to test broad hypotheses, including the hypothesis 
that the inclusion of (several) power sharing provisions improves the chances of success of a peace 
agreement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Mattes and Savun, 2009; Mukherjee, 
2006; Norris, 2008; Ottmann and Vüllers, 2015; Walter, 2002). 
To illustrate the unique contribution of the PAIC dataset to this broad academic debate, we decided to 
replicate a widely accepted empirical finding in conflict studies: Hartzell and Hoddie’s Crafting peace 
(2007). We chose to replicate this seminal work for two reasons. First, several members of our team 
have a keen interest in power sharing. Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) evaluate the impact of power sharing 
on war-to-peace transitions by focusing on the relationship between power sharing provisions in peace 
agreements (rather than their implementation) and the non-occurrence of violence in the aftermath of 
the peace agreement. Second, despite an increasing number of datasets and burgeoning research on 
power sharing, Hartzell and Hoddie’s 2007 findings remain a fundamental part of the orthodoxy 
regarding the long-term impact of power sharing and are routinely cited by both qualitative and 
quantitative scholars (for example, Bormann et al., 2019; Cederman et al., 2015; McCrudden and 
O’Leary, 2013). Hence, most readers of this manuscript would be familiar with their writings and a 
replication of Crafting peace can illustrate well the usefulness and novelty of the PAIC data set. 
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Like Hartzell and Hoddie (Table 7 replicates their results, 2007: 78), we look at the five years after the 
conclusion of an agreement and estimate the risk of resumption of violent conflict. Hartzell and 
Hoddie’s dataset partly corresponds to the PAIC dataset, but PAIC includes a larger number of cases 
and focuses on the post-Cold War period only. Therefore, for the purpose of replication, we used the 
same statistical model (cox proportional hazard model) and control variables (Table A3 of the 
appendix). As the PAIC dataset only includes agreements concluded after 1989, we do not account for 
structure of the international system (coded as a binary indicator of Cold War and post-Cold War in 
Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007) because it is unnecessary. 
Our main independent variable (the inclusion of power sharing provisions in a political agreement) is 
measured through the relevant variable in PAIC, leading to a more fine-grained measure of power 
sharing. PAIC accounts for six dimensions of power sharing: political, economic, military, judiciary, 
civil service and other body or commissions (see also the appendix). In contrast to Hartzell and Hoddie 
(2007), we do not include territorial power sharing in our independent variable because territorial self-
governance (in the form of dispersion of power to the subnational level) is not indicative of co-decision-
making by the conflict parties, which is the core feature of power sharing (see also the operationalisation 
of territorial self-governance above).7 PAIC captures provisions that afford representatives of self-
governing units a voice in central government institutions through power-sharing variables.8 
To illustrate the usefulness of our dataset in general, we only use the control variables from Hartzell 
and Hoddie 2007 as a baseline comparison model for the statistical models (Model 1, Table III). 
                                               
7 As an additional robustness test we ran a survival analysis that includes territorial self-governance (see Table A2 and Figure 
A3-A5 in the appendix). Our overall conclusion remains robust: power sharing in other body or commission remains the most 
important driving factor to longer peace. Hence, our findings differ from Hartzell and Hoddie (2007) even when we include 
territorial self-governance in our measure of power-sharing, corroborating the value of PAIC in generating new knowledge 
on how political agreements foster peace. 
8 Bormann et al. (2019) draw a distinction between inclusive and dispersive power-sharing, as do Strom et al. (2017) who 
distinguish between inclusion, dispersion, and constraint as three institutional dimensions of political power sharing.  
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The second model uses a cumulative variable of all six dimensions of power sharing, ranging from 0 to 
6 (Model 2 in Table III). This is the closest model to Hartzell and Hoddie’s (2007) study. On the one 
hand, our model points to a similar relationship between a cumulative power sharing variable and the 
likelihood of peace to fail (i.e. the likelihood of conflict to recur). However, this effect is not significant. 
In other words, our data does not provide statistically significant evidence that more power sharing is 
necessarily better for resolving intra-state violent conflict. 
However, the results change when we split the power sharing variable into 6 individual dummy 
dimensions (Model 3 of Table III), reflecting the six dimensions in the PAIC dataset: political, 
economic, military, judiciary, civil service, and other body or commissions. Model 3 reveals a 
significant positive effect of power sharing in other bodies or commissions, with this provision 
increasing the likelihood of lasting peace after a political agreement. When we employ even more fine-
grained variables, breaking down power sharing into provisions for determining who sits on other 
bodies or commissions (representation) and provisions for mapping rules of decision-making 
(participation), our evidence suggests that the representation of politically relevant groups in other 
bodies or commissions is crucial to increasing the length of a post-agreement period of peace (Model 4 
in Table III). Yet, the empirical evidence, as always with regression analysis, does not allow us to make 
a causal claim.  
Figure 4 shows two survival functions based on Model 4 where one survival function shows the 
likelihood of survival of peace if a political agreement does not include any power sharing provisions 
(dashed line) in comparison with the likelihood of survival of a political agreement including only a 
specific type of power sharing: representation in other body or commission (continuous line). It is 
apparent that provisions to include representatives of politically relevant groups in other bodies or 
commissions crucially increase the length of a peace spell.9 Indeed, political agreements providing for 
the representation of politically relevant groups in other bodies or commissions are 8% more likely to 
survive than agreements which do not include any power sharing dimensions. This finding does not 
                                               
9 For illustration purposes, we have added the survival functions of Models 1 and 2 of Table III into the Appendix (Figure A1 
and A2). 
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depend on survival analysis, but we find similar evidence when we look at a logit estimation on the 
recurrence of conflict after the signing of a political agreement (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
 
Figure 4: Effect of power sharing representation and participation on the survival of peace. Six power sharing 
dimensions in nine dummy variables divided into participation and representation for each dimension (political, 
economic, judicial, military, civil service, and other body or commission) for Model 4 in Table III 
 
 
 
Further research will be necessary to fully establish the causal mechanisms which underlie the statistical 
relationship between power sharing in commissions and peace. At this juncture we can make some early 
suggestions based on the logic behind the delegation of governance tasks to these bodies (see Walsh, 
2014; 2017; 2018). Frequently both sequencing and mandates provide that independent commissions 
are among the first institutions established in the aftermath of a peace accord, increasing the likelihood 
that power sharing provisions in this arena are implemented. In line with Jarstad and Nilson (2008), this 
may account for their greater impact. 
Moreover, the ‘credibility hypothesis’, developed to explain the creation of independent commissions 
in non-conflict environments, argues that ‘political sovereigns are willing to delegate important powers 
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to independent groups to increase the credibility of their policy commitments’ (Majone, 2001). In the 
post-conflict context, even where a political agreement has resolved the core issues which led to 
conflict, conflict parties may still have different preferences with regard to a wide range of policies. In 
this environment, the delegation of powers to an independent body can overcome logjams which could 
become sources of renewed violence.  
Furthermore, a ‘delegation hypothesis’ proposes that if certain tasks are delegated to commissions, this 
could lower the political cost of making decisions that may be unpopular with important constituencies 
of the conflict parties while being beneficial to wider society. Delegation allows political leaders to 
place the ‘blame’ for such decisions on the commissions, whose composition often extends beyond 
political leaders to technical experts and representatives of civil society. This can insulate political 
leaders from accusations of sell-out based on their willingness to compromise, protect them against 
electoral out-bidding by more hard-line politicians, and prevent more extreme political leaders from 
gaining power (Walsh, 2014). 
Finally, our finding regarding the importance of power sharing in commissions also highlights the 
broader importance of inclusion in successful war-to-peace transitions and the continuing efforts 
required in implementing and operating political agreements and the institutions they create to end 
violence. Commissions afford a critical opportunity to depoliticise the search for solutions to politically 
and emotionally charged problems and to include representatives from other segments of society not 
directly connected to the immediate conflict parties in a wider peace process from which they might 
otherwise be excluded. In this sense, the value of commissions may also lie in their ability to facilitate 
sequencing in peace processes and in gradually broadening and entrenching coalitions of support that 
can work as a critical backstop against conflict recurrence. The non-confrontational nature of these 
bodies also may also make it more likely that they will embed power-sharing practices,  
as outlined in Bormann et al (2019). These and other causal mechanisms need to be investigated  
further in qualitative work, but they point to the importance of sustained international assistance beyond 
the conclusion of an agreement. Most importantly, mediators need to be aware of the options that 
commissions present, the need to make them representative, and the fact that they may require long-
term international assistance to be effective. 
  28 
Table III: Replicating Hartzell and Hoddie 2007 using PAIC data. 
  Controls Only Model 1 
Power sharing 
One Variable 
Model 2 
Power sharing Six 
Variables 
Model 3 
Power sharing 9 
Variables 
Model 4 
Power sharing six dimensions (in 
one variable) 
  0.833     
  (0.150)     
Power sharing Political (Dummy) = 
1 
  1.220  
  (0.572)  
Economic power sharing (dummy) = 
1 
  0.372  
  (0.485)  
Judicial power sharing (dummy) = 1 
  0.207  
  (0.238)  
Military power sharing (dummy) = 1 
  2.322  
  (1.269)  
Power sharing in the civil service 
(dummy) = 1 
  2.810  
  (2.296)  
Power sharing in other body or 
commission (dummy) = 1 
    0.359**   
    (0.165)   
Political power sharing 
(representation dummy) = 1 
   1.366 
   (0.679) 
Political power sharing 
(participation dummy) = 1 
   1.158 
   (1.011) 
PS-Representation-Military = 1    2.713* 
    (1.601) 
PS-Participation-Military = 1    0.165 
    (0.259) 
PS-Representation-Body-
Commission = 1 
      0.283** 
      (0.158) 
PS-Participation-Body-Commission 
= 1 
      3.796 
      (3.545) 
PS-Representation-Civil Service = 1    2.842 
    (2.421) 
PS-Representation-Economic = 1    0.344 
    (0.456) 
PS-Representation-Judicial = 1    0.156 
    (0.208) 
Conflict is an ethnic conflict = 1 1.975 1.790 2.303 2.012 
 (1.124) (1.031) (1.311) (1.194) 
Length of previous conflict 1.002 1.002 1.003* 1.003* 
 (0.00139) (0.00142) (0.00155) (0.00163) 
Cumulative conflict intensity 
(UCDP) = 1 
8.888*** 9.685*** 9.640*** 9.763*** 
(4.609) (5.151) (5.569) (5.806) 
Life expectancy at birth, total 
(years) 
0.899*** 0.887*** 0.892*** 0.880*** 
(0.0285) (0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0371) 
Polity 2 (level of democracy) 1.056 1.067 1.062 1.071 
 (0.0750) (0.0778) (0.0783) (0.0875) 
Peace keeping operation = 1 0.650 0.599 0.369 0.286* 
 (0.310) (0.295) (0.243) (0.201) 
Observations 514 514 514 514 
standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.05    
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Conclusion  
This article presented the dataset of Political Agreements in Internal Conflicts (PAIC), which relies on 
expert and fine-grained coding of 286 political agreements aiming to manage or ameliorate violent 
conflict between 1989 and 2016. Due to its innovative approach and its empirical relevance, we expect 
the PAIC dataset to open up opportunities for novel research agendas in three main respects.  
First, the PAIC dataset includes new information about phenomena of high empirical relevance: cultural 
reform, territorial self-governance, and power sharing in commissions. Therefore, it will allow scholars 
to investigate hitherto overlooked provisions of peace settlements and the conditions under which they 
occur. For example, future projects could explore the contextual factors leading to the adoption of 
specific cultural provisions in a political settlement and/or analyse the relationship between cultural 
reforms and sustainable peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. Building on the finding that power 
sharing in commissions may contribute decisively to the resilience of a pact, future studies may examine 
the set up and impact of independent commissions in and after peace processes worldwide.  
Second, PAIC’s fine-grained and comprehensive qualitative coding encourages mixed methods 
investigation by facilitating the systematic and rigorous selection of case studies and allowing for testing 
qualitative and quantitative research questions with unprecedented precision. Indeed, by allowing for 
the aggregation of data at the polity and conflict level, PAIC contributes to critical research agendas 
laid out, inter alia, by Sambanis and Schulhofer-Wohl (2019). Moreover, by including accords 
addressing instances of ‘armed politics’ (Staniland, 2017) PAIC may be employed to shed light on the 
end of armed orders worldwide. Finally, by combining breadth with depth of data, PAIC could result 
in studies combining statistical models on PAIC with qualitative case-based investigations, as well as 
in research employing Qualitative Comparative Analysis of PAIC combined with qualitative case-
focused comparisons. 
Third, we expect that PAIC and the research based on its nuanced data will enable scholars to offer 
context-specific policy recommendations that inform future peace negotiations and agreement design. 
For example, it may be possible to examine the conditions for conflict recurrence drawing on a selected 
number of comparable agreements in PAIC and coding for their implementation. PAIC would also 
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allow to investigate peace processes as a series of agreements and to understand better the relationship 
between agreements, international assistance, and what constitutes 'continuity' (Sambanis and 
Schulhofer-Wohl, 2019: 1548, see also Staniland, 2017: 461). This effort could engage a variety of 
practitioners and policymakers in the search for best practices to attain sustainable peace, justice, and 
democracy. 
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Appendix:  
Variables for the Replication of ‘Crafting peace: Power sharing institutions and the 
negotiated settlement of civil wars’ (2007). 
cspv_ethwar_binary (stakes of conflict): cspv_ethwar “Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic 
warfare” (Teorell et al. 2018: 156) recoded into a binary variable. 1) Yes ethnic war 0) No 
ethnic war 
cum_conflict_intensity (conflict intensity): We use the binary coding of intensity from the 
UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 17.2.10 1) intense war 0) No intense war 
con_length_yearsmonth_TSCS (conflict duration): We use UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, 
Version 17.2 taking the difference between the year the political agreement was signed 
(from the PAIC) and the start year of the conflict provided by UCDP. 
p_polity2 (previous level of democracy): We use the present level of democracy using the “Revised 
Combined Polity Score” p_polity2 (Teorell et al. 2018: 478) but the statistical results are 
robust if we use the historic level of democracy before the conflict broke out. 
wdi_lifexp (economic development): We use life expectancy, following Hartzell and Hoddie (2007). 
The indicator is drawn from Toerell et al. (2018: 678; “wdi_lifexp Life expectancy at birth, 
total (years)”). 
                                               
10 “Intensity_level: The intensity variable is coded in two categories: 1. Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a 
given year. 2. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.” UCDP data version 17.2 codebook: 9 
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PS_6_Dimensions: 6 dummies for power sharing (hereafter PS) added into one variable: Additive 
index of all six PS dummy variables into one variable. Value 6 for all PS dimensions 
present (irrespective whether it is enabling or prescriptive) and 0 for no PS present. Ordinal 
measurement level 0 to 6. 6) 6 forms of PS present 0) NO form of PS present 
PS1_Political_DUM: Political power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable for 
political PS (both in the executive and the legislative). Value 0 for no political PS and 1 
for any form of political PS. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS2_Economic_DUM: Economic power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable for 
economic PS. Value 0 for no economic PS and 1 for any form of economic PS. 1) YES 0) 
NO 
PS3_Judicial_DUM: Judicial power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable for 
judicial PS. Value 0 for no judicial PS and 1 for any form of judicial PS. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS4_Military_DUM: Military power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable for 
military PS. Value 0 for no military PS and 1 for any form of military PS. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS5_CivilService_DUM: Power sharing in the civil service (dummy variable): This is a dummy 
variable for PS in the civil service. Value 0 for no PS in the civil service and 1 for any form 
of PS in the civil service. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS6_OhterBodyorCommission_DUM Power sharing in other body or commission (dummy 
variable): This is a dummy variable for PS in another body or commission. Value 0 for 
no PS in another body or commission and 1 for any form of PS in another body or 
commission. 1) YES 0) NO 
REPRESENTATION  
PS_REP_POLITICAL_DUM Political power sharing representation (dummy variable): This is a 
dummy variable for political PS (both in the executive and the legislative). Value 0 for no 
political PS and 1 for any form of political PS. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS2_REP_Economic_DUM: Economic power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy 
variable for economic PS representation. Value 0 for no economic PS and 1 for any form 
of economic PS representation. 1) YES 0) NO 
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PS3_REP_Judicial_DUM: Judicial power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable for 
judicial power sharing representation. Value 0 for no judicial PS and 1 for any form of 
judicial PS representation. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS4_REP_Military_DUM: Military power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable 
for military PS representation. Value 0 for no military PS and 1 for any form of military 
PS representation. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS5_REP_CivilService_DUM: Power sharing in the civil service (dummy variable): This is a 
dummy variable for PS in the civil service representation. Value 0 for no PS in the civil 
service and 1 for any form of PS representation in the civil service. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS6_REP_OhterBodyorCommission_DUM Power sharing in other body or commission (dummy 
variable): This is a dummy variable for PS in another body or commission representation. 
Value 0 for no PS representation in another body or commission and 1 for any form of PS 
representation in another body or commission. 1) YES 0) NO 
PARTICIPATION 
PS_PART_POLITICAL_DUM: Political power sharing participation (dummy variable): This is 
a dummy variable for political PS participation (both in the executive and the legislative). 
Value 0 for no political PS and 1 for any form of political PS participation. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS2_PART_Economic_DUM: Economic power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy 
variable for economic PS participation. Value 0 for no economic PS and 1 for any form of 
economic PS participation. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS3_PART_Judicial_DUM: Judicial power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable 
for judicial PS participation. Value 0 for no judicial PS and 1 for any form of judicial PS 
participation. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS4_PART_Military_DUM: Military power sharing (dummy variable): This is a dummy variable 
for military PS participation. Value 0 for no military PS and 1 for any form of military PS 
participation. 1) YES 0) NO 
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PS5_PART_CivilService_DUM: Power sharing in the civil service (dummy variable): This is a 
dummy variable for PS in the civil service participation. Value 0 for no PS in the civil 
service and 1 for any form of PS participation in the civil service. 1) YES 0) NO 
PS6_PART_OhterBodyorCommission_DUM Power sharing in other body or commission 
(dummy variable): This is a dummy variable for PS in another body or commission 
participation. Value 0 for no PS participation in another body or commission and 1 for any 
form of PS participation in another body or commission. 1) YES 0) NO  
 
Replication of ‘Crafting peace: Power sharing institutions and the negotiated 
settlement of civil wars’ (2007): Additional Figures and Robustness Checks. 
  
Figure A1: Effect of control variables on survival of peace (Model 1 of Table III). 
  43 
  
Figure A2: Effect of power sharing (six dimensions in one cumulative variable including political, economic, judicial, 
military, civil service, and other body or commission) on the survival of peace (Model 2 of Table III). 
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Table A1: CLogLog and logit analysis of the effects of peace agreement with power sharing arrangements on the risk of onset 
of violent intrastate conflicts, 1989-2016. 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Conflict Re-Onset Conflict Re-Onset Conflict Re-Onset Conflict Re-Onset
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Conflict Re-Onset
Conflict length in years (prior to signature of °0.00 °0.00 °0.00 °0.00
political agreement) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Cumulative conflict intensity (UCDP) 2.46§§ 2.47§§ 2.50§§ 2.50§§
(0.62) (0.62) (0.62) (0.61)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) °0.04§ °0.05§ °0.05§ °0.05§§
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Polity 2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
PKO °0.16 °0.14 °0.15 °0.16
(0.24) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25)
Peace years °0.01 °0.01 °0.01 0.02
(0.52) (0.52) (0.51) (0.51)
Peace years sqd °0.00 °0.00 °0.00 °0.01
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Peace years cub °0.00 °0.00 °0.00 °0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Power-Sharing six dimensions (in one variable) °0.05
(0.05)
Political power-sharing (dummy) 0.11
(0.18)
Economic power-sharing (dummy) °0.02
(0.36)
Judicial power-sharing (dummy) 0.41
(0.29)
Military power-sharing (dummy) 0.01
(0.33)
Power-sharing in the civil service (dummy) °0.21
(0.30)
Power-sharing in other body or °0.40§
commission (dummy) (0.19)
PS-Representation-Political 0.22
(0.18)
PS-Participation-Political °0.48+
(0.26)
PS-Representation-Military 0.06
(0.30)
PS-Participation-Military °1.11
(1.41)
PS-Representation-Body-Commission °0.42§
(0.19)
PS-Participation-Body-Commission 0.32
(0.27)
PS-Representation-Civil-Service °0.28
(0.31)
PS-Representation-Economic 0.06
(0.40)
PS-Representation-Judicial 0.52+
(0.27)
Constant 0.06 0.17 0.28 0.31
(1.23) (1.25) (1.23) (1.18)
Observations 1126 1126 1126 1126
Countries 55 55 55 55
Adjusted Count R2 °0.04 °0.05 °0.02 °0.01
Adjusted McFadden R2 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24
AIC 688.06 689.62 695.61 699.06
BIC 733.30 739.88 771.01 789.53
Note:+significant at 10%; *significant at 5%; **significant at 1%. Clustered standard errors are in parantheses. Estimations performed using Stata 15.
2
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Table A2: Replicating Hartzell and Hoddie 2007 using PAIC data and including territorial self-governance as part of power 
sharing. 
  
Power sharing 
One Variable 
Power sharing 
Seven Variables 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 3 
   
Power-Sharing seven dimensions (in one variable) 0.890   
  (0.145)   
Conflict is an ethnic conflict = 1 1.816 2.679* 
 (1.053) (1.559) 
Length of previous conflict 1.002 1.003** 
 (0.00141) (0.00157) 
Cumulative conflict intensity (UCDP) = 1 9.520*** 8.161*** 
 (5.074) (4.695) 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) 0.893*** 0.884*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0342) 
Polity 2 1.062 1.050 
 (0.0765) (0.0779) 
PKO = 1 0.608 0.406 
 (0.299) (0.269) 
Political power sharing (dummy) = 1  1.274 
  (0.591) 
Economic power sharing (dummy) = 1  0.357 
  (0.459) 
Judicial power sharing (dummy) = 1  0.243 
  (0.283) 
Military power sharing (dummy) = 1  2.458 
  (1.388) 
Power sharing in the civil service (dummy) = 1  2.509 
  (2.051) 
Power sharing in other body or commission (dummy) = 1   0.303** 
    (0.144) 
Territorial Self-Governance = 1  2.246 
  (1.239) 
Observations 514 514 
seEform in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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A3 Operationalization of control variables for application section 
Variable Operationalization 
Stakes of conflict:  
we use an ethnic war measurement for the Quality of Government 
data set cspv_ethwar “Magnitude score of episode(s) of ethnic 
warfare” (Teorell et al. 2018: 156), recoded into a binary variable 
where 0 is not ethnic war and 1 is an ethnic war 
Conflict intensity:   we use the binary coding of intensity from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 17.2.11  
Conflict duration: 
we use UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, Version 17.2 taking 
the difference between the year the political agreement was signed 
(from the PAIC) and the start year of the conflict provided by 
UCDP. 
Previous level of 
democracy:   
we use the present level of democracy using the “Revised 
Combined Polity Score” p_polity2 (Teorell et al. 2018: 478) but 
the statistical results are robust if we use the historic level of 
democracy before the conflict broke out. 
Economic development:  
 
we use life expectancy, following Hartzell and Hoddie (2007). The 
indicator is drawn from Toerell et al. (2018: 678; “wdi_lifexp Life 
expectancy at birth, total (years)”). 
Peace keeping operation:  
we use the Peace Keeping Operation variable of the PAIC data set 
(Peace Keeping Operations are employed as control variables by 
inter alia, Druckman and Wagner 2017). 
 
Figure A3: Effect of power sharing (seven dimensions in one cumulative variable including political, economic, judicial, 
military, civil service, other body or commission, and territorial self-governance) on the survival of peace (Model 1 of Table 
A2). 
                                               
11 “Intensity level: The intensity variable is coded in two categories: 1. Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a 
given year. 2. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.” UCDP data version 17.2 codebook: 9 
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Figure A4: Effect of power sharing (seven separate dummy variables for each power-sharing dimension in one cumulative 
variable including political, economic, judicial, military, civil service, other body or commission, and territorial self-
givernance) on the survival of peace (Model 2 of Table A2).  
 
Figure A5: Effect of power sharing (seven separate dummy variables for each power-sharing dimension in one cumulative 
variable including political, economic, judicial, military, civil service, other body or commission, and territorial self-
governance) on the survival of peace (Model 2 of Table A2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  48 
 
 
Figure A6: Number of Political Agreements including provisions for Peace Keeping Operations Concluded by Year 
 
 
 
Figure A7: Number of Political Agreements including provisions for International Monitoring Concluded by Year 
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Figure A8: Number of Political Agreements Including Provisions for International Assistance with Implementation 
Concluded by Year 
 
 
Figure A9: Number of Political Agreements Including Provisions for Direct Governance by International Actors 
Concluded by Year 
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